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Nontechnical Summary
Convergence is a catchy idea, but one that organizes serious thinking in
areas as diverse as economic growth, theoretical econometrics, nance,
European politics and monetary union, regional planning and geography,
up through but not ending at entertainment and multi-media technology,
and the software industry.
Some growth economists dene convergence as a single economy
approaching its theoretically-derived steady state growth path. Others
translate this to whether poor economies are catching up with rich ones.
Yet others think of these two statements as being identical, and thus of
either indicating convergence.
At one extreme, econometricians and probabilists have found it use-
ful to work with dierent notions of convergence of sequences of random
variables. At a dierent extreme, economists and policy-makers in Eu-
rope have obsessed on the Maastricht convergence criteria. Finally, when
high-tech, fast-growth market participants|people who actually create
value in modern economies|get together, they too excitedly discuss con-
vergence, but now between biological and machined products, or between
communications, computers, and content. 1996). In every instance the
term convergence is used with a dierent meaning|and rightly so.
That convergence suers from this meaning-overload should not dis-
guise its importance. This paper concerns convergence in the sense of
poor economies catching up with the rich. If by economies, one means
countries, then magnitudes of the numbers alone should already show
why convergence is important. Some countries have been doubling per
capita incomes every decade; yet others have been stagnant, with levels
of per capita income a hundred times lower than those of the leading
economies.
Such back-of-the-envelope facts are obvious and easy to obtain. But
are there empirical regularities beyond them that could be useful for
advancing economists' understanding of convergence? If the current sit-
uation continues, how will cross-country income distributions look in the
future? Will rich economies always remain in a \club" of rich countries,
and similarly the poor? What possibilities are there for switches across
relatively poor and relatively rich?
Consider the same question, but now with the economies being re-
gions within countries: are poorer regions languishing, currently and for-
ever behind richer ones, or do they face any possibility of catching up?
As before, one seeks an empirical characterization on such dynamic pos-
sibilities suciently precise and apposite so that one can understand the
implications of alternative scenarios.
Such questions concern the behavior over time of cross-section dis-
tributions of income (or output or welfare): the issues are, writ large
to the scale of macroeconomies or regions, the same as those that have
traditionally been the concerns of research on the dynamics of inequality
and personal income distributions. Are the distributions collapsing, so
that everyone shows a tendency to become equally well o? Instead, are
the distributions increasing in dispersion, so that those relatively better
o are getting more so? Or, are the distributions tending towards shapes
that show clusters and subgroups, so that the population is polarizing
and then stratifying into distinct classes? Questions like these are useful
for appreciating patterns of cross-country growth, just as they are for
understanding patterns of dynamics and mobility in individuals' incomes
within societies.
Such questions also show that economic growth|while unquestion-
ably important for welfare|need not be the only mechanism permitting
understanding of convergence. In the framework adopted below, con-
vergence might occur because of growth. Or, convergence might occur
without growth. Pinning down a theory of growth is not essential to un-
derstanding whether poor economies will become rich, or whether they
will remain poor. I should clarify that I am not referring here to the
classical Kuznets question: What is the relation between income distribu-
tions within an economy and the aggregate growth path of that economy?
Rather, I am concerned with the growth paths of many dierent aggre-
gate economies and the implications those have for the dynamics of the
income distribution across that same collection of economies. The more
central question is, What determines the dynamics of cross-economy in-
come distributions? Mechanisms of growth might be an important part
of the answer; then again, they might not.
This paper provides an overview of recent research that takes this
distribution-dynamics approach to analyzing convergence. It claries how
this work diers from more traditional analysis. And, it points to where
subsequent work is needed, and suggests alternative theoretical ideas to
explore.
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ABSTRACT
Convergence concerns the poor catching up with the rich|if not instan-
taneously, then at least having a tendency to do so. When poor and
rich here refer to entire economies, then whether convergence occurs is
traditionally viewed as just a side consequence of a more central ques-
tion, namely that concerning the nature of economic growth. This paper
argues instead that convergence itself is of direct interest. When conver-
gence is made central and thus investigated, new theoretical issues and
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1. Introduction
Convergence is a catchy idea, but one that organizes serious thinking in areas as
diverse as economic growth, theoretical econometrics, nance, European politics
and monetary union, regional planning and geography, up through but not ending
at entertainment and multi-media technology, and the software industry.
Some growth economists dene convergence as a single economy approaching
its theoretically-derived steady state growth path. Others translate this to whether
poor economies are catching up with rich ones. Yet others think of these two
statements as being identical, and thus of either indicating convergence.
At one extreme, econometricians and probabilists have found it useful to
work with dierent notions of convergence of sequences of random variables. At
a dierent extreme, economists and policy-makers in Europe have obsessed on
the Maastricht convergence criteria. Finally, when high-tech, fast-growth mar-
ket participants|people who actually create value in modern economies|get to-
gether, they too excitedly discuss convergence, but now between biological and
machined products, or between communications, computers, and content (e.g.,
Kelly, 1994 and Tapscott, 1996). In every instance the term convergence is used
with a dierent meaning|and rightly so.
That convergence suers from this meaning-overload should not disguise its
importance. This paper concerns convergence in the sense of poor economies
catching up with the rich. If by economies, one means countries, then magnitudes
of the numbers alone should already show why convergence is important. Some
countries have been doubling per capita incomes every decade; yet others have
been stagnant, with levels of per capita income a hundred times lower than those
of the leading economies.
Such back-of-the-envelope facts are obvious and easy to obtain. But are there
empirical regularities beyond them that could be useful for advancing economists'
understanding of convergence? If the current situation continues, how will cross-
country income distributions look in the future? Will rich economies always remain
in a \club" of rich countries, and similarly the poor? What possibilities are there
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for switches across relatively poor and relatively rich?
Consider the same question, but now with the economies being regions within
countries: are poorer regions languishing, currently and forever behind richer ones,
or do they face any possibility of catching up? As before, one seeks an empirical
characterization on such dynamic possibilities suciently precise and apposite so
that one can understand the implications of alternative scenarios.
Such questions concern the behavior over time of cross-section distributions
of income (or output or welfare): the issues are, writ large to the scale of macroe-
conomies or regions, the same as those that have traditionally been the concerns of
research on the dynamics of inequality and personal income distributions. Are the
distributions collapsing, so that everyone shows a tendency to become equally well
o? Instead, are the distributions increasing in dispersion, so that those relatively
better o are getting more so? Or, are the distributions tending towards shapes
that show clusters and subgroups, so that the population is polarizing and then
stratifying into distinct classes? Questions like these are useful for appreciating
patterns of cross-country growth, just as they are for understanding patterns of
dynamics and mobility in individuals' incomes within societies.
Such questions also show that economic growth|while unquestionably im-
portant for welfare|need not be the only mechanism permitting understanding of
convergence. In the framework adopted below, convergence might occur because
of growth. Or, convergence might occur without growth. Pinning down a theory of
growth is not essential to understanding whether poor economies will become rich,
or whether they will remain poor.
1
The more central question is, What determines
the dynamics of cross-economy income distributions? Mechanisms of growth might
be an important part of the answer; then again, they might not.
1
I should clarify that I am not referring here to the classical Kuznets question:
What is the relation between income distributions within an economy and the
aggregate growth path of that economy? Rather, I am interested in growth paths
of many dierent aggregate economies and the implications those have for the
dynamics of the income distribution across that same collection of economies.
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This paper provides an overview of recent research that takes this distribution-
dynamics approach to analyzing convergence. It claries how this work diers from
more traditional analysis. And, it points to where subsequent work is needed, and
suggests alternative theoretical ideas to explore.
To clarify how such an approach to studying convergence diers from more
traditional ones, Section 2 develops a series of theoretical models. It begins with
models that underpin conventional understanding on growth and convergence, and
progresses to models that focus on convergence as distribution dynamics, and
where growth occurs almost mechanically. In this last set of models, despite the
near-trivial specication of economic growth, intricate patterns of convergence and
divergence nevertheless emerge.
Section 3 provides the empirical counterpart to the analyses in Section 2: once
again, we study how congurations of convergence and divergence|or, alterna-
tively, of stratication and polarization|appear in the cross section of economies.
Finally, Section 4 briey concludes.
2. Theoretical models
This section develops a series of models to make precise the notion of convergence
across economies. I begin with a deterministic, classical growth model, and con-
sider its convergence implications. These predictions are the ones traditionally
taken to be useful for understanding the dynamics of rich and poor economies.
In one interpretation, they are also the implications that have importantly inu-
enced thinking on exogenous and endogenous growth. It is this framework that
has traditionally tied together so closely discussions of growth on the one hand
and convergence on the other.
Next, I provide a stochastic version of essentially the same growth model:
this permits clarifying where the original interpretation of convergence is useful,
and where it is not. Finally, I develop a model where convergence|catch up
between rich and poor across a rich cross section of economies|becomes the central
concern. In this last model, growth in each of the economies is fairly mechanical:
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nevertheless, what emerges are intricate patterns of convergence and divergence,
and of stratication and polarization.
2.1 Neoclassical deterministic growth and convergence
The development given here of deterministic, neoclassical growth theory's conver-
gence predictions is well-known (e.g., Romer, 1994). Nonetheless, it will be useful
as a starting point for the analyses that follow.
Assume that, in the representative economy, aggregate output is produced
by a multiplicative-technology, constant returns to scale production function in
capital and labor. Normalizing by labor, per worker output can be written as
the product of technology A and a function f of per worker capital k (lower-case
symbols denoting per worker quantities):
y = Af(k); f dierentiable and invertible: (1)
It is traditional to refer to y as productivity (in the sense of average per-worker
output), and to A as the Solow or productivity residual. Taking growth rates on
both sides of equation (1) gives
_y=y =
_
A=A+

f
0
(k)k
f(k)

_
k=k: (2)
Two points are immediate, both relating to the factor f
0
(k)k=f(k) that multiplies
_
k=k on the right-hand side. First, if the economy is one that compensates factor in-
puts according to marginal product, then this multiplicative term has an economic
interpretation: it is physical capital's factor share in national income. Second, it
follows that|regardless of how compensation actually occurs|that multiplica-
tive term is bounded between 0 and 1. This therefore restricts how much capital
deepening
_
k=k can hope to contribute to productivity growth _y=y.
Such a bound applies regardless of how
_
k=k is itself determined. That de-
termination, however, is useful to develop explicitly. Call N the total quantity of
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labor. In our convention of lower- and upper-case symbols, the aggregate quantity
of capital is K = kN and aggregate output is Y = yN . Then,
_
k=k =
_
K=K  
_
N=N:
Suppose that the (technology-adjusted) rate of aggregate capital accumulation is
constant:
 =
_
K
Y=A
2 (0; 1):
Substituting this into the previous equation,
_
k=k = ((Y=A)=K)  
_
N=N
= ((y=A)=k)  
_
N=N
=
(y=A)
f
 1
(y=A)
  
_
N=N;
where equation (1) has been inverted to solve for k. Using this expression for
_
k=k
in equation (2) gives y's proportional growth rate as a function of, among other
things, its level:
_y=y =

_
A=A  

f
0
(k)k
f(k)

_
N=N

+

f
0
(k)k
f(k)

 
(y=A)
f
 1
(y=A)
: (3)
For analyzing convergence, what matters is the last levels term on the right-
hand side. If the production technology in (1) has the power form
f(k) = k

; 0 <   1; (4)
then that last term in levels becomes
(y=A)
f
 1
(y=A)
= (y=A)
1 
 1
;
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where, by construction, 1  
 1
 0. This technology specication (4) also gives
that the restricting factor f
0
(k)k=f(k) is not just bounded (possibly varying) be-
tween 0 and 1 but actually constant at . Using these in equation (3), we have
_y=y =

_
A=A  
_
N=N

+ A
 (1 
 1
)
 y
1 
 1
(5)
= 
0
+ 
1
 y
1 
 1
(6)
(with 
0
and 
1
dened in the obvious way).
From a convergence perspective, equation (6) gives the theory's predicted
relation between income growth _y=y, income levels y, and physical capital's pro-
ductivity coecient . Since 1 
 1
 0 and increases in , tending to 0 as  goes
to 1, one might read equation (6) to say that rich economies grow slower, while
poor ones grow faster. Convergence is faster, the smaller is . Abstracting away
from dierences and scale eects in 
0
and 
1
, the convergence situation is as in
Fig. 1, where the dierent time paths illustrate dierent economies.
To see the algebra through completely, one might proceed as follows. Rear-
range (5) to get
_y=y  
_
A=A = 
h
 (y=A)
1 
 1
 
_
N=N
i
: (7)
A steady state in y=A thus exists when
_
N=N is positive and (eventually) constant.
That steady-state level for y=A is given by the unique zero of (7) at
(y=A)

=


 1
_
N=N

(1 
 1
)
 1
:
Moreover, since 1   
 1
is negative, the ratio y=A is globally stable around its
steady state state. (At that steady state, y of course grows at the same rate as A.)
How rapidly does convergence occur? Dene z
def
= y=A, and log-linearize (7)
around steady state z

= (y=A)

to get
_z=z =  (1  )

_
N=N

 (log z   log z

): (8)
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This is simply a rst-order dierential equation in log z   log z

. The larger is ,
the slower is the rate of convergence of log z to log z

.
Such a depiction of convergence gives rise to a research program with a num-
ber of features (see, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). First, the researcher
might consider 
0
and 
1
in (6) or
_
N=N and z

in (8) to vary, plausibly, with
diering structural characteristics of dierent economies. Examples of such char-
acteristics might include democracy, political stability, tax regime, religious ethos,
colonial heritage, and so on. The researcher then seeks \conditional convergence",
where Fig. 1 obtains only after conditioning on those other characteristics. Such
conditioning, however, leaves unchanged the basic message: those auxiliary vari-
ables, after all, entered the discussion only after the derivation of convergence in
equations (1){(6) and Fig. 1. Conditioning can aect neither the intuition nor the
interpretation surrounding the convergence of Fig. 1.
Second, to investigate empirically equations (6) or (8) or Fig. 1, the researcher
seeks a convergence regression: there, one is interested if growth (on the left-
hand side) depends negatively on levels (on the right). That regression would
formalize the intuition where as one looks across the dierent economies in Fig. 1,
one expects to see richer ones growing relatively slower, and poorer economies,
relatively faster. On the left-hand side of such a regression, one might proxy
growth rates by an average of log rst-dierences. On the right-hand side, one
might have a range of auxiliary conditioning variables, and then income levels.
When negative, the coecient on income levels denotes convergence (in the sense
of Fig. 1); its magnitude measures the speed of convergence and varies negatively
with physical capital's productivity coecient. In this model, a zero coecient on
income levels would imply physical capital's productivity coecient  equal to 1.
If one were to interpret equations (6) and (8) as applying only over the long-
run, then the averaged log rst-dierences appearing on the left-hand side of the
regression should be averages taken over an appropriately long time horizon. Con-
sequently, the regression would be estimated eectively only over the cross-section
(and not time-series) dimension. As usual in such work, the researcher investigates
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the convergence regression equations (6) and (8) tacking on a stochastic residual
at the end.
When one carries out this research program|either using explicit regression
analysis (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) or informal comparison (e.g., Romer,
1994), one concludes that in the data the growth/levels relation implies  should
be close to 1. More signicantly, however, one concludes that  is much larger
than would be implied by capital's factor share in national income accounts. This,
by itself, has been an important spur to the development of growth models that
feature externalities, increasing returns, endogenous technical progress, or other
possibilities breaking the link between  and capital's measured factor share. Re-
searchers like Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), moreover, claim to nd conditional
convergence, and thus conclude that Fig. 1 is operative, and that the poor do catch
up with the rich, if slowly.
2
Throughout this discussion, we have only considered a single, representative
economy. Thus, in this research program, one implicitly identies convergence
of that representative economy's z to its z

also as cross-sectional convergence of
dierent economies towards each other (as in Fig. 1).
2.2 Stochastic growth
Above, I described the empirical implementation of equations (6) and (8) in terms
of tacking on a stochastic residual at the end. Since the equations cannot be
expected to t perfectly, something like this is obviously necessary. Two issues,
however, then arise. First, there may be interesting economics omitted when
2
An earlier literature, e.g., Grier and Tullock (1989), studied a similar regres-
sion equation with growth on the left-hand side and explanatory variables on the
right. I distinguish this from the later work only because that research did not
show the same preoccupation with convergence. It instead only investigated, us-
ing exploratory empirical techniques, the determinants of growth|an important
question, certainly, but distinct from convergence.
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one simply adds on a stochastic residual as an afterthought. And, second, the
interpretation of Fig. 1 in terms of the poor catching up with the rich might no
longer be appropriate. We consider these in turn.
Stochastic disturbances induce uncertainty: a rich cross section of economies
might then not behave just as a collection of individualistic, autarkic elements, as
implicitly assumed in the previous development. In this case, one fruitful ap-
proach might be to explore insurance arrangements across the distribution of
aggregate economies (using ideas from, e.g., Bertola, 1995; Lucas, 1992; and
Thomas and Worrall, 1990). Groupings of selected economies might endogenously
emerge|depending on patterns of insurable and uninsurable disturbances across
economies|with growth patterns then varying across dierent groupings. Because
identication becomes important|which economies go in which groupings|such
an outcome would depart from the \representative economy" analysis above. To
keep within space restrictions, however, I will not analyze this further here: the
model developed in the next subsection will carry similar predictions (although
it will not be stochastic, and thus groupings will occur for other than insurance
reasons).
A dierent, more direct possibility is that stochastic disturbances might, prop-
erly considered, break the link between convergence, capital's productivity coe-
cient , and factor income shares. This idea has been explored in den Haan (1995),
Kelly (1992), and Leung and Quah (1996). I follow the last of these in developing
this possibility, but keep as close as I can to the deterministic model previously
studied. Some properties of the stochastic model will translate directly from the
deterministic case; however, to be clear where the new subtleties are, it helps to
be more explicit about economic behavior than I have been thus far.
In the cross section distribution, index economies by j; it will be convenient
now to suppose that time is discrete. Variables specic to economy j at time t will
have subscript j and be parenthesized t.
Assume that each economy behaves autarkically and that, in equilibrium, can
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be described by the following social planning problem: at time t
0
, solve
sup
f(c
j
(t);k
j
(t+1)):tt
0
g
E
t
0
1
X
t=t
0
(1 + )
 t
log c
j
(t);  > 0 (9)
s.t. y
j
(t) = A(t)k
j
(t)
(t)
(10)
c
j
(t)  y
j
(t)  k
j
(t+ 1); t  t
0
;
k
j
(t
0
) > 0 given.
In (9),  describes the discount factor. The last two relations state, respectively,
the capital accumulation constraint and that the time t
0
-extant capital stock is
xed.
The stochastic elements introduced are encapsulated in the technology and
productivity terms A and : these can now vary randomly through time. Assume
that f (A(t); (t)) : integer t g is a jointly stationary vector process with all entries
(almost surely) positive.
3
When this process is degenerate, equation (10) collapses
to the production technology of the previous section. By contrast, with A and 
nondegenerate stochastic processes, we will see that they give rise to the stochastic
disturbances that, in the previous section, had been simply tacked on at the end.
Keeping to our earlier interpretation, A and  are taken to be common across
economies: thus, while they might vary over time, they are constant over the cross
section.
3
To simplify the technical exposition, I also assume that logA has bounded
second moment. In neoclassical exogenous growth models, it is important that A
be permitted to grow without bound, whereupon these stationary and bounded-
moment assumptions would be violated. However, as should have already become
clear from our earlier discussion, growth in A is not central to the current conver-
gence discussion. At the cost of more extended exposition, everything here can be
done taking deviations relative to an unboundedly growing A process. However,
no additional insight obtains.
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Assume that at time t every economy observes the same history,
F(t) = fA(s); (s); y
j
(s); k
j
(s) : s < t; all j g :
Expectations conditioned on this history will be denoted E
t
= E (  jF(t)), a no-
tation already used in (9). By this timing assumption, in general, E
t
A(t) 6= A(t)
and E
t
(t) 6= (t). Not allowing economies, at time t, to know time-t productivity
disturbances is not crucial for the discussion but simplies notation.
In equilibrium, in each time period t, economies behave as if a social planner
chooses consumption and investment functions based on what is observable at time
t. Under regularity conditions, those optimal decision rules lead to
k
j
(t+ 1) =
 
(E
t
(t))(1+ )
 1

y
j
(t); (11)
so that from (10) output behaves as
y
j
(t+ 1) = A(t+ 1)
 
(E
t
(t))(1+ )
 1

y
j
(t)

(t+1)
:
Taking logs and dening ey
def
= log y give the rst-order stochastic dierence equa-
tion:
8t  t
0
: ey
j
(t + 1) = logA(t + 1) + (t+ 1) log(E
t
(t))
  (t+ 1) log(1 + ) + (t+ 1)ey
j
(t)
= (t+ 1) + (t+ 1)ey
j
(t) (12)
with initial condition
ey
j
(t
0
) = logA(t
0
) + (t
0
)
e
k
j
(t
0
); (13)
and where  in (12) is dened as:
(t) = logA(t) + (t) log(E
t 1
(t  1))  (t) log(1 + ): (14)
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Immediate from the assumptions on f (A(t); (t)) : integer t g we have that the
stochastic process f (t) : integer t g is stationary and common across economies.
4
All the model's dynamics|and hence all its convergence implications|are
embedded in equations (12){(14). To make those implications explicit, rst take
the case where (t) =  2 (0; 1]: this has capital's productivity coecient constant
as in the previous section, but the Solow productivity residual A is stochastic.
Then, (14) becomes
(t) = logA(t) +  log((1 + )
 1
);
up to a shift in mean,  simply inherits all the stochastic properties of logA. From
(12) and (13), the distribution of output across economies evolves as
ey
j
(t+ 1) = ey
j
(t) + (t+ 1) for t  t
0
; (15)
ey
j
(t
0
) = logA(t
0
) + 
e
k
j
(t
0
): (16)
Iterating (15) forwards from the initial condition (16), we get
ey
j
(t) = 
t t
0
ey
j
(t
0
) +
t 1 t
0
X
s=0

s
(t  s): (17)
Since  is stationary, if  is 1, then ey
j
for each j is an integrated (order 1) process.
5
If, further, A is iid through time, then equation (15) says that ey
j
(for each j) is a
random walk with drift
E = E logA+  log((1 + )
 1
)
4
Leung and Quah (1996) observe that since , the \residual", is common across
economies, a cross-section convergence regression cannot actually be estimated
consistently in this model. Relaxing the commonality of , on the other hand,
means that convergence as in Fig. 1 necessarily cannot occur.
5
When  = 1, then from (15), ey
j
is always one order of integration higher than
. Thus, should the Solow residual A itself tend to an integrated order 1 sequence,
ey
j
will then be integrated order 2.
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which could be positive, negative, or zero. Should the discount rate  be large
(relative to the technology terms  and E logA), then ey
j
= log y
j
diverges to
 1 (when  = 1), implying then that y
j
converges to 0, independent of initial
conditions.
This case is, however, relatively uninteresting: it is when economic agents
discount the future so heavily that accumulation doesn't occur and the economy
thus collapses on itself. More relevant is when the drift E is non-negative. Then
there are two possibilities: when  is strictly less than 1, and when  is exactly 1.
Take rst the case with  < 1. From (17), as t grows large, ey
j
(for each j)
converges to a random variable having a unique stationary or invariant distribution
given by the distribution of
(t)
def
=
1
X
s=0

s
(t  s)
for any integer t. (If, for example,  is distributed iid normal with mean E and
variance Var(), then that invariant distribution is normal with mean E=(1  )
and variance Var()=(1  
2
) identically across (t)'s).
That unique invariant distribution, by denition, must be attained indepen-
dent of initial conditions. It is, moreover, typically nondegenerate. What happens,
however, to the cross-section distribution of ey
j
's across j? Since the limiting (t)'s
are the same for all j, the cross section distribution turns out to collapse to a
single point: it behaves not at all like the time-series distribution of ey
j
for a xed
(but arbitrary) j.
This dierence between cross section and time series dimensions arises for a
quite trivial and easily identied reason: the model has taken A and , and thus
, to be common across economies.
The same insight applies to when  is 1: once again, simply study equation
(17). Although for each j, the sequence ey
j
(t) does not converge in t to any invariant
distribution, the cross-section distribution across j's is completely stable, and does
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not diverge. That cross-section distribution just moves up and down, perturbed
by a single common factor: no intra-distribution relative movements occur.
Again, this happens because A and  have been assumed to be common across
economies. It thus seems fairly trivial. The conceptual diculty arises, however,
when one asks, What assumption should replace this commonality property? Any
assumption|especially an iid one|is going to be equally arbitrary, and more to
the point, will give predictions for the cross section distribution as mechanically
and simply as those just obtained. In this kind of \representative economy" anal-
ysis, economic theory plays almost no role in helping us understand the behavior
of the cross-section distribution. Depending only on arbitrary assumptions on un-
observable disturbances, the cross section distribution across economies on the one
hand and the time-series distribution of any single economy in the cross section
on the other can behave completely dierently.
The point is emphasized if we return to the general case in equations (12){(14).
Then, iterating (12), we obtain the counterpart of equation (15):
ey
j
(t) =
"
t t
0
Y
s=1
(t
0
+ s)
#
ey
j
(t
0
) +
t 1 t
0
X
s=0
"
s 1
Y
r=0
(t  r)
#
(t  s): (18)
Kelly (1992) and Leung and Quah (1996) prove that equation (18) converges to a
degenerate cross-section distribution across economies, even when (t) has expec-
tation 1 and exceeds 1 with positive probability. Put another way, equation (12)
could show a coecient on lagged ey
j
that is large|the technology (10) could show,
on average, physical capital having productivity coecient 1|yet, convergence of
the cross-section distribution to a degenerate point could still occur.
The stochastic model thus far has been used to argue that a convergence re-
gression coecient indicating no convergence|in the sense of Section 2.1|can
be consistent with the cross-section distribution collapsing to a point. The op-
posite can also occur: a convergence regression coecient indicating convergence
is also consistent with the cross-section distribution expanding. An easy way to
understand this is to use equation (17) with  < 1, and allow  to be iid across
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economies. Then, by Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem, the cross-section and time-series
distributions coincide. Since the (time-series) invariant distribution is unique, the
cross-section distribution tends to it from wherever that cross-section distribution
might happen to be. In particular, this must happen even when the cross-section
distribution is already more tightly concentrated than the invariant distribution
(see Fig. 2). Under such circumstances, the cross-section distribution will be seen
to diverge, even when  < 1, and convergence regressions indicate convergence.
What I have just described is an instance of the general message from Gal-
ton's fallacy reasoning (see, e.g., Friedman, 1992 and Quah, 1993). Here, one can
usefully regard its lesson as the following: the dynamics of a representative or av-
erage economy in the cross section say little about the behavior of the entire cross
section distribution.
To conclude, the message from this subsection can be stated in two dierent
ways. First, in the kind of \representative economy" model studied thus far, it
is the assumptions on exogenous stochastic disturbances that are dominant for
the behavior of the cross section distribution: economic theory gives no useful
guide to those dynamics. Second, even a complete characterization of the dynamic
behavior of a representative economy tells little about the dynamics of the entire
cross-section distribution.
These statements suggest how misleading is the apparently obvious message
of Fig. 1|of poor catching up with rich provided only that technology coecients
take particular values or that certain regression coecients take particular signs.
To make progress on analyzing convergence, one needs an economic model that
theorizes explicitly in terms of the cross section distribution.
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2.3 Cross-section dynamics and convergence
Quah (1996e) develops a model of convergence for a rich cross section distribution
of economies.
6
In the model, a balance between a force for consolidation and a
force for fragmentation results in coalitions forming across dierent parts of the
distribution of economies. Those coalitions then turn out to behave like conver-
gence clubs (e.g., Baumol, 1986). The model explains the dynamics of the entire
cross section distribution, and directly gives predictions on convergence.
The model is most naturally viewed as one where growth and convergence
arise from human capital or the generation of ideas.
7
We therefore switch from the
earlier models where accumulating physical capital k is important to one where it is
accumulating human capital h that matters. Let J be the index set of economies,
taken as xed throughout the discussion. A coalition of economies is a subset
C of J. Each economy l in J is characterized by an economy-specic stock of
human capital h
l
. That stock is used in two nonrival ways: rst, it represents
the potential for generating ideas, and second, it produces non-storable output for
consumption. Ideas that are further developed then increment the stock of human
capital, thereby driving economic growth.
Production occurs from coalitions of economies forming to jointly produce a
single nondurable consumption good. Denote the total output of coalition C by Y
C
.
Assume that Y
C
depends on the distribution of h
l
across l in C, and is increasing
in each h
l
. Assume also that out of the total coalition output, economy l in C
gets  (Y
C
; h
l
), with  increasing in both arguments, and satisfying exact product
exhaustion:
X
l in C
 (Y
C
; h
l
) = Y
C
:
6
More general models with cross-sectional interaction (e.g., Benabou, 1996 and
Durlauf, 1993) could also provide other useful insights here.
7
This is a little bit of a misstatement as we will see that in equilibrium growth
turns out to be fairly mechanical, while it is patterns of convergence and divergence
that are interesting and intricate.
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(Primitive assumptions sucient for these properties would be rst, compensation
according to marginal product and second, the CES technology
Y
C
=

X
l in C
h

l

1=
; 0 <  < 1
[with , describing the elasticity of substitution in the CES production function,
giving isoquants between linear and Cobb-Douglas technologies]. Quah (1996e)
gives the natural interpretation of these properties as economies of scale deriving
from specialization.)
By the assumptions above, enlarging the coalition always increases total out-
put Y . Then the compensation scheme  ensures that all economies unanimously
agree to be in the single grand coalition comprising the entire cross section. This,
therefore, is a force for consolidation.
Consider next how the distribution of h's evolves. In every instant of time,
economy l generates ideas of average quality h
l
. Assume that it rst gets to use
those ideas and then shares them with others in its coalition. Ideas propagate freely
within coalitions, but do not transmit across them.
8
Call H
C
the average quality
of ideas generated in coalition C, and suppose that human capital in economy l
evolves as:
_
h
l
=
e
(h
l
; H
C
) for l in C;
with
e
 increasing in both arguments and homogeneous degree 1. Dividing through-
out by h
l
we get:
_
h
l
=h
l
=
e
(1; H
C
=h
l
)
def
= (H
C
=h
l
):
8
This might be because ideas or memes are like viruses and thus could be
dangerous|members of dierent coalitions are not trusted. Or, members of a
coalition are able to enforce intellectual property rights perfectly across coalitions.
Quah (1996e) gives a more extended discussion of this. The general idea of memes,
or ideas as genes, is discussed in Dawkins (1976) and Kelly (1994).
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By construction  is increasing in the ratio H
C
=h
l
.
It is now easy to understand the force for fragmentation. Economies in higher
average h coalitions have faster proportional growth rates. The problem with al-
lowing a coalition to get too large|expanding below|is that the coalition thereby
lowers its averageH
C
: this would slow growth for all economies already in the coali-
tion. Economies already in good coalitions would, ceteris paribus, refuse to admit
economies that lower the coalition average H
C
.
The force for consolidation (the compensation  (Y
C
; h
l
)) is a level eect|it
aects current consumption. The force for fragmentation (the growth (H
C
=h
l
))
is a slope eect|it aects future consumption. Parameterizing economies' dis-
count rates for intertemporal consumption allows calibrating the tradeo across
level and slope eects, and thus provides a theory of coalition formation. Quah
(1996e) describes an equilibrium where nontrivial consecutive subsets of the cross
section distribution of economies form coalitions. The distribution of income across
economies within the same coalition converges towards equality; those across dif-
ferent coalitions separate and then diverge (Fig. 3).
In equilibrium rich economies converge towards each other, but remain rich;
similarly the poor remain poor. The middle class eventually vanishes, and the
income distribution straties. Those in the middle part of the income distribution
might begin close to each other, but over time diverge apart: small dierences here
become magnied eventually into large disparities. By contrast, within extreme
parts of the distributions, economies, over time, have their dierences diminish.
Because only two convergence clubs form in Fig. 3, it is natural to consider the
dynamics here as showing an emerging twin peaks character. In general, multiple
clubs may form, the number of which will then the number of emerging modes in
the long-run cross-section distribution of incomes.
In this model, conditional convergence occurs. This is a conditional conver-
gence, however, that depends critically on the coalition structure in equilibrium.
Dierent rules for how coalitions form would lead, in general, to dierent distri-
bution dynamics. Appreciating those rules provides understanding on the strati-
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cation and polarization that emerges across the cross section.
More generally, the model in this subsection draws attention to two features
in Fig. 3 relevant for convergence. First is the abeyant emergence of peaks in
the cross-economy income distribution. Second is the intra-distribution dynamics,
where dierent economies in the cross section, over time, transit to dierent parts
of the distribution.
3. Empirics
Conventional wisdom on cross-section regression analyses of convergence is that
cross-economy convergence occurs, once appropriate conditioning is applied (Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 1996). In this conventional wisdom, such
convergence is stable and uniform at 2% per year.
Quah (1996c) has argued that such empirical stability might be simply a
statistical artifact. He provides Monte Carlo evidence that heterogeneous unit root
data|that, by construction, contradict stable uniform convergence in the sense
described above|could nevertheless generate a stable 2% convergence rate, given
the sample sizes of observations typically used. In those Monte Carlo experiments,
the cross-section income distributions diverge over time; yet, the 2% convergence
regression nding is reproduced, on average.
But the theoretical analysis in Section 2 provides yet other reasons for doubt-
ing the usefulness of such results for analyzing convergence. Whether or not the
2% estimate is statistically reliable, it can provide no guide for convergence behav-
ior across the cross section. The interesting features in Fig. 3 can certainly never
be captured by cross-section (conditional or unconditional) convergence regression
analysis.
9
However, it is exactly such dynamics that will shed light on convergence
patterns across economies.
The most apposite empirical approach parallels the theoretical analysis of
subsection 2.3 in modelling directly the dynamics of the entire cross section distri-
9
Regression techniques that could potentially do so are the adaptive procedures
in Ben-David (1994) and Durlauf and Johnson (1995).
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bution. Note that such a motivation diers from the technical ones traditionally
given of either exploiting simultaneously cross section and time-series dimensions of
the data for great precision in estimation and inference or permitting \exibility"
in estimating time-varying and nonlinear regression or distribution functions.
10
Instead, the goal is to provide a picture of how the entire cross-section distribution
evolves over time, and to understand the long-run or limiting behavior of that
cross-economy income distribution.
Fig. 4 gives a rst preliminary look at cross-economy distribution dynam-
ics. The dierent panels in Fig. 4 show point-in-time snapshots of the density
of normalized productivity across countries.
11
Thus, Fig. 4 cannot show intra-
distribution or churning dynamics in the evolving distributions. It can, however,
and evidently does show an emerging twin-peakedness.
The econometric task in studying convergence, therefore, is to formulate a
model that (i) is capable of capturing the dierent possibilities in Fig. 3 (including,
signicantly, the intra-distribution dynamics as well as the shapes of the point-in-
time distributions); (ii) accepts data in the form of distributions as in Fig. 4; and
(iii) allows analysis of long-run or out-of-sample behavior in the distributions. Call
a structure allowing (i){(iii) a model of explicit distribution dynamics (or medd).
Desdoigts (1994), Lamo (1996), Paap and van Dijk (1994), and Quah (1993a, b,
10
Thus, the aim here diers from those emphasized in Canova and Marcet
(1995), Forni and Reichlin (1995), Lee, Pesaran, and Smith (1995), Quah (1994),
and Quah and Sargent (1993).
11
The underlying data here are from Summers and Heston (1991), version 5.6.
Productivity is per worker output; the normalization is with respect to average
world productivity. For simplicity, below, I refer to per capita income or just
income interchangeably with average worker productivity. All densities were ob-
tained using a gaussian kernel with bandwidth selected automatically, as suggested
in Silverman (1986) 3.4.2. I used a fast fourier transform to calculate the resulting
kernel estimator; a reection method (Silverman 1986, 2.10) took into account
nonnegativity in the productivity data.
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1996b) have studied convergence in terms of medd structures.
12
The underlying
framework common to all this research is the following.
Let F
t
denote the time t cross-economy income distribution. Associated with
each F
t
is a probability measure 
t
, where
8 y 2 R : 
t
(( 1; y]) = F
t
(y):
A stochastic dierence equation describing distribution dynamics is then

t
= T

(
t 1
; u
t
); integer t; (19)
where fu
t
: integer t g is a sequence of disturbances, and T

is an operator map-
ping the Cartesian product of probability measures with disturbances to prob-
ability measures. (Needless to say, the rst-order specication in (19) is just a
convenience for the discussion. Nothing substantive hinges on it, and the model
easily generalizes to higher-order dynamics.)
Formedd analysis, one is also interested in intra-distribution dynamics. Equa-
tion (19) therefore has to record more than just means and standard deviations or,
more generally, a nite set of moments of the distribution sequence fF
0
; F
1
; : : :g.
Equation (19) takes values that are measures, rather than just scalars or nite-
dimensioned vectors, and thus diers from the typical time-series model.
The structure of T

reveals if dynamics like those in Fig. 3 occur. Estimated
from observed data, T

allows empirical quantication of those dynamics. Eco-
nomic hypotheses restrict T

in particular ways: they therefore provide predictions
on how 
t
, and thus the distributions F
t
, evolve over time.
12
When one is interested only in a small subset of the entire cross-section distri-
bution, then vector time-series methods (e.g., Bernard and Durlauf, 1995) would
be informative for convergence properties. Univariate time-series models, however,
never are: I discuss this more below. Also, medd structures need not be restricted
only to convergence issues, but might also be used for modelling business cycle
uctuations across many dierent sectors or regions (e.g., Quah, 1994, 1996a).
{ 22 {
Just as in time-series analysis, the researcher might seek to understand T

by
its \impulse response function": set the disturbances u to 0 (whatever 0 means
here), and run out the dierence equation:
T

(
t+s 1
; 0) = T

(T

(
t+s 2
; 0); 0)
.
.
.
= T

(T

(T

: : : (T

(
t
; 0); 0; ) : : :0); 0);
(20)
with the result being a proxy for 
t+s
. Then, convergence in country incomes
to equality might be represented by (20) tending, as s ! 1, towards a degener-
ate point mass. Alternatively, the world polarizing into rich and poor might be
represented by (20) tending towards a two-point measure: the implied limit dis-
tribution F
t+s
; s ! 1, would then be bimodal or twin-peaked. More generally,
stratication into dierent convergence clubs might manifest in (20) tending to-
wards a multi-point, discrete measure, or equivalently, a multi-modal distribution.
How quickly a given initial distribution, F
0
, evolves into the limiting distribution,
F
t+s
; s!1, can be read o T

's (spectral) structure.
Finally, T

also contains information on intra-distribution dynamics. Exploit-
ing that structure, one can quantify the likelihood of the poor catching up with
the rich, and characterize the (random) occurrence times for such events.
While this framework borrows ideas from standard time-series analysis, cer-
tain conceptual dierences are critical. To appreciate those dierences, rst con-
sider when the researcher discretizes the underlying income state space so that
distribution  is given by just a probability vector. The researcher might be
tempted to write (19) as

t
=M
t 1
+ u
t
(21)
(with M a square matrix representing the operator T

), and then call (21) simply
a vector autoregression (VAR) taking values on the unit simplex. This, however,
would be incorrect. If (19) could be written as the VAR in (21), matrix M would
be identied from (i.e., uniquely determined by) the sequence f
t
: integer t g.
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However, for describing distribution dynamics, multiple M 's in (21) can be asso-
ciated with any given distribution sequence: as just one example, the distribution
sequence 
t
= (1=2; 1=2) for all t is t perfectly in (21) by any of
M
1
=

1 0
0 1

; M
2
=

1=2 1=2
1=2 1=2

; or M
3
=

0 1
1 0

:
Thus, the dierence equation (19) must contain strictly more information than the
VAR formulation (21).
Next, a time-series researcher might ask, Since (19) describes the joint dy-
namics of a collection of individual time-series processes, why not just characterize
the behavior of the underlying variables directly? One might do this by estimat-
ing univariate or small multivariate time-series representations for subsets of those
underlying income series. Suppose the researcher estimated univariate represen-
tations for each of the underlying variables. What can the researcher learn about
\emerging twin peaks" tendencies from those? The answer is nothing. Knowing
univariate representations for each of the underlying income series can give no in-
formation on comovements across the cross section: establishing, say, that the rst
income series is a rst-order autoregression with coecient 0.8, while the second is
a mixed moving average autoregression, and so on, can provide no understanding
of how the dierent incomes covary. Thus, there might be a tendency towards twin
peaks in the cross-section distribution; or there might not: one cannot tell from
the collection of all univariate representations. Moreover, this negative conclu-
sion extends from when the researcher is studying only univariate representations
to when studying multivariate time-series models for subsets of the cross section:
there too one learns nothing about \emerging twin peaks" possibilities for the
entire cross-section distribution.
13
13
Note that after one has learnt about the dynamics of the entire distribution,
it might be of interest to go back and study the underlying individual time-series
representations. But, to be clear, such analysis only complements the study of
distribution dynamics; it cannot be a substitute.
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The time-series researcher might then consider building a model for the joint
dynamics of a rich cross-section of individual time series (e.g., Canova and Marcet,
1995; Forni and Reichlin, 1995; or Quah and Sargent, 1993). It is tautological
that a rich enough model must be able to capture all the features of interest in
the original data set. The question then becomes what is the most direct and
transparent way to capture characteristics of interest. In my view, when one
is concerned with an \emerging twin peaks" property, then a model of explicit
distribution dynamics of the form (19) is best: the distribution 
t
becomes the
fundamental object of study.
Following the notation above, the estimated T

's in Desdoigts (1994), Lamo
(1996), Paap and van Dijk (1994), and Quah (1993a, b, 1996b) all show an emerg-
ing twin-peaks character in the cross-country income distributions.
14
Because esti-
mated T

's qualify as medd's, they can shed light on that seductive intuition|the
poor growing faster and thereby catching up with the rich|that growth-on-levels
regressions wish to exploit. Quah (1996b) calculates, from an estimated T

, the
probability density of passage times from poor parts of the income distribution to
rich parts. He nds that although growth miracles|the Hong Kongs, the South
Koreas, and the Singapores|can happen with reasonable positive probability, the
passage time from the bottom 5% percentile to the top, given the magnitude of the
gap extant, averages in the hundreds of years. Thus, persistence and immobility
characterize the world cross section of country incomes.
15
14
Bianchi (1995) sidesteps the dynamics in equation (19), and considers 
t
's in
isolation. He too, however, nds the twin-peaks property of Fig. 3, as one might
expect from the evidence in Fig. 4. Bianchi's work diers from those mentioned in
the text as he seeks modal properties only in-sample; the others allow those prop-
erties to manifest out of sample by the extrapolation in equation (20). Bianchi's
analysis is a statistical formalization of exactly Fig. 4.
15
It is worth noting that similar twin-peaks features do not describe every such
macro income distribution sequence. Compare what I have just said of the world
cross section of countries with, for example, US and European regional behavior,
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The evidence therefore suggests, in the large, keeping Fig. 3, but modifying it
so that the arrows showing intra-distribution dynamics are allowed to cross. Why
this crossing comes about is not yet well-captured in explicit distribution-dynamics
models like those in Quah (1996b, e). However, these calculations can be viewed
as the econometric formalization of the \miracles" (e.g., Lucas, 1993) that theory
should continue to seek to explain.
The natural next step then is to ask, What explains the observed emerging
twin-peaks patterns in cross-country income distributions? Of course, in a sense,
models like those in Quah (1996b, e) already explain those patterns; what such a
question must intend instead is, What measured variables empirically account for
patterns like emerging twin peaks? When the fundamental object of study is an
entire distribution, empirically accounting for the patterns of interest in it has a
subtle interpretation. For one, it cannot mean just getting a high R
2
or signicant
t-statistics in a regression: a regression, at best, helps us understand conditional
means; it does not account for the entire distribution.
The approach I take here|described in detail in Quah (1996d)|is analogous
to constructing a conditional distribution from the unconditional distribution, in
classical probability theory. In this framework, explaining features like emerging
twin peaks means obtaining conditional distributions so that such features no
longer appear.
Figures 5.d and 6.d show cross-country income distributions conditioning on
trade and on space; Figures 5.s and 6.s show stochastic kernels transforming the
original income distributions in Fig. 4 into the corresponding distributions in Fig-
ures 5.d and 6.d.
What I mean by conditioning is the following: instead of taking incomes
relative to the world average|and then nding their cross-section distribution|
take instead incomes relative to those of the economy's principal trading partners
(conditioning on trade), or relative to those of the economy's physical neighbors
e.g., Quah (1996c, f). Quah (1996f) has also analyzed the behavior of cross-
economy income distributions, conditioning on spatial eects.
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(conditioning on space). By trade, I mean the sum of exports and imports; by
principal trading partners, I mean those economies such that their total trade with
a given economy exceeds 50% of that economy's total trade. Obvious variations
on this are easy: one might look only at exports or at imports rather than their
sum; one might look at the 3 (or n) largest trading partners, rather than a variable
number of them; one might use 80% as the threshold rather than 50% for dening
the group of trading partners; and so on.
16
Within a reasonable range of variation,
however, perturbations along these lines do not dramatically alter the conclusions
below.
To appreciate better what is involved here, take, for instance, Algeria: its
trade-conditioned income is dened to be its income relative to the average of in-
comes in France, USA, Italy, and Morocco, with that average weighted by these
economies' trade shares in Algeria. By contrast, Algeria's spatial-conditioned in-
come is its income relative to the average of incomes in Mali, Mauritania, Morocco,
Niger, and Tunisia, weighted by the number of workers in those economies. For
Singapore, its trade-conditioned income is relative to Guinnea Bissau, Oman, the
US, Japan, Malaysia, Maritius, and Qatar, while its spatial-conditioned income is
relative to Malaysia and Indonesia.
As for spatial conditioning, if economies across the world formed a seamless
web in physical geography, then one might expect the resulting (conditioned) dis-
tribution to be tightly concentrated about 1. After taking into account spatial
factors, all economies would be just about average: all the poor economies in
sub-Saharan Africa might be poor relative to the rest of the world, but not rel-
ative to each other. Similarly, the relatively rich economies|rich relative to the
world|again would be just about average, relative to their also-rich neighbors.
The stochastic kernel shows how the unconditional distribution is transformed
into a conditional one. If the mass of the kernel piled up on the 45-degree diagonal,
then the transformation is one that leaves unchanged the original distribution's fea-
16
These variations all constitute examples of what Quah (1996d) calls condi-
tioning schemes.
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tures. If, on the other hand, the kernel swings counter-clockwise|with most of its
mass then lying in swathes parallel to the Conditioned axis|then that condition-
ing operation has successfully explained the original distribution's characteristic.
Figures 5 and 6 display exactly that counter-clockwise pivot. Thus, they
show the importance of space and trade in explaining the \emerging twin peaks"
of Fig. 4. Quah (1996d) explores these issues further.
4. Conclusion
This paper has argued that convergence|because it concerns poor economies
catching up with rich ones|forces the researcher to study what happens to the
entire cross sectional distribution of economies. What matters for convergence is
not whether a single economy is tending towards its own, individual steady state.
Instead, what matters is the behavior of the entire distribution.
Moreover, while understanding economic growth is undoubtedly important,
convergence can be insightfully studied by itself. This paper shows that taking
such an approach leads to theoretical and empirical analyses that, in turn, raise
further interesting questions.
In section 2, a series of growth models progressively emphasized the impor-
tance of understanding the dynamics of the cross section distribution. Section 2
argued that \representative-economy" reasoning would be unlikely to shed much
light on whether the poor can catch up with the rich. A model that departs usefully
from such reasoning might then involve ideas about coalition and group formation,
as analyzed above, but would help explain the dynamics of cross-economy income
distributions.
Section 3 described empirical analyses that adopt this distribution-dynamics
perspective. Cross-country empirical ndings thus far have conrmed the impor-
tance of studying convergence in this way: they have revealed a range of behavior
in the cross section that are hidden from \representative-economy", convergence
regression analysis.
Statistical analysis of medd's is, in economics, in its early stages. (Extensions
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to what I have described above are in, among others, Desdoigts, 1996; Magrini,
1995; Quah, 1995a, b; and Trede, 1995.)
Viewing convergence as distribution dynamics diverts focus away from eco-
nomic growth as just boosting the arguments of a production function and towards
understanding interaction across economies. Such interaction could take the form
of ordinary merchandise trade. Or, as in Section 2.3 above, it could take the form
of coalition formation. Theoretical models of individual cross-section interaction
and group formation have also begun to be explored elsewhere (already mentioned
above, for instance, are Benabou, 1996 and Durlauf, 1993). Much, however, re-
mains to be done.
Finally, in this paper I have emphasized convergence only in the context of
cross-economy behavior. Many of the same ideas and techniques, of course, apply
directly to other types of distribution dynamics: a leading example would be the
behavior of personal and family income distributions (e.g., Johnson and Reed,
1996). Convergence there|in the sense of dynamic inequality|is as important as
convergence across economies. While, through Kuznets-based reasoning, dynamic
inequalities in personal incomes could be related to economic growth, it does so
in a way dierent than does cross-country convergence. Therefore, that growth
matters for both might, in fact, be usefully ignored in their study.
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